From Germs Control to Arms Control: Security Negotiations in the Era of Coronavirus

1 Introduction¹

As Leo Tolstoy noted in 1877, ‘All happy families are alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way’.² While the COVID-19 pandemic has affected all of the diplomatic practice, arms control and non-proliferation diplomacy — its relatively small but important subset — faced unique challenges. Even before the global health emergency, arms control was in a precarious state. Its architecture born out of the Cold War was crumbling, while the increasingly confrontational international environment precluded any meaningful diplomatic progress in this field.

On top of that, because of the pandemic arms control diplomats were challenged by the lack of proper means of communication, difficulties in verifying agreements already in place and controversies over the origin of the virus itself. The way those issues would be addressed would have a lasting effect on arms control and non-proliferation diplomacy.

2 Communication

Arms control and non-proliferation diplomacy is one of the most conservative fields within the profession. It is strongly rooted in tradition, deals with highly sensitive matters and requires significant technical expertise. Thus, there is little wonder it did not end up at the forefront of adapting to the COVID-19 pandemic.

While social distancing affected all diplomats and was an obvious stress test for a profession relying on in-person meetings and private conversations, some parts of the diplomatic universe adapted (or were required to adapt) quicker than others. Standing bodies like the UN Security Council and other UN organs switched to virtual meetings,³ although not without difficulties. Teleconferencing proved to be a suitable format for Group of 20 and Group of 7 Summits as well as for other high-profile events such as the UK-hosted Global Vaccine Summit. Remote meetings were extensively used in place of regular diplomatic exchanges.⁴

By contrast, arms control along with other security talks that are centred around periodic get-togethers such as conferences or working sessions were mostly postponed rather than moved online. These include the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference held every five years, the consultation on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas (EWIPA), meetings of Arms Trade Treaty working groups and intersessional consultations by an Open-Ended Working Group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security (the latter two continued their work through written responses to draft documents).⁵

There were notable exceptions such as the meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in June 2020 and the conference of signatories to the Open Skies Treaty on 7 July 2020. However, the latter demonstrated potential challenges associated with holding such meetings online. During the conference, the video stream of the Russian delegation was interrupted three times, which undermined the impression from the presentation, according to a participant.⁶ Moscow denied there were any technical issues on its side.

The events with less visibility and more negotiations involved were hit hardest. The spring session of the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) — the deliberative body under the New START Treaty that limits nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States — was cancelled because of the pandemic. The parties did not try to hold the BCC meeting in virtual format even though it was one of the two remaining occasions before the expiration of the treaty. The pandemic has similarly impacted strategic stability dialogue between Moscow and Washington. Despite the statement of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that Russia and the United States planned to hold a videoconference on strategic stability,⁷ it never materialised. The parties exchanged phone calls and jumped to restart face-to-face contacts as soon as it was feasible. A new strategic stability meeting took place on 22 June 2020 in Vienna, even though the European Union had not yet opened its borders to foreigners by that time and the regular flights to the city had not resumed.

Forgoing the online option could be partly explained by the nature of negotiations but also had to do with the lack of suitable virtual platforms, which would be secure and support meetings with multiple speakers. This might seem especially surprising in the case of Russia and the United States since Moscow and Washington have a long history of developing encrypted communication lines for nuclear-related issues. The USSR and the United States established a direct teletype communication link for the top leadership in 1963. It had at least seven major upgrades to enable facsimile and later telephone communication. The latest update in 2008 established ‘a direct secure communication system’ between the two countries.⁸ Apart from the communications at the leadership level, both countries run Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs) at the Russian Ministry of Defence and US State Department, respectively, to exchange notifications and communications mostly related to specific arms control agreements between the two countries. The latest revision of 1987 NNRC Agreement happened in 2013 but, even though it resulted in the upgrade of the hardware, the communication link was still limited to exchange of ‘text and graphics files’.⁹ Instruments developed for emergency contacts and exchange of treaty-related data turned out to be ill-equipped for hosting multiperson negotiations at the working level.

Another example of an existing communication tool for security issues is the Communications Network of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The computer-based system with terminals in OSCE participating states and the OSCE Secretariat is used to exchange messages between states related to arms control and confidence- and security-building measures. According to the US delegation to the OSCE,¹⁰ during the pandemic there was a ‘robust exchange’ of information via this channel. However, it also was not designed for negotiations and only supports implementation of existing agreements.

For now, the diplomats expect to see travel restrictions lifted and their work returning to normal. But new waves of the COVID-19 or another pandemic would bring the issue back to the table. Whereas previously teleconferencing in diplomacy was more of a solution in search of a problem, in the world of limited in-person meetings even arms control diplomats would need to invest in new communications channels. These would have to be suitable for multiperson negotiations and guarantee security of sensitive discussions, which cannot be trusted to commercial solutions. Russia and the United States, specifically, would not need to start from scratch. Be it the further development of the NRRCs or establishment of a stand-alone system, there would already be channels and protocols to build on.

3 Verification

The COVID-19 pandemic brought international travel to a halt. While the diplomats were scrambling to move their meetings online, another sphere was hit even harder — on-site inspections designed to verify the implementation of the arms control and non-proliferation agreements.

In March 2020, Russia and the United States suspended on-site inspections, crucial for verifying compliance with the New START Treaty.¹¹ The pause was originally meant to last until May but as of early August the activity has not resumed. Out of 36 inspections permitted under the treaty per year, Moscow and Washington only held 4 in the first half of 2020.¹² Activities under other arms control and transparency agreements — the Vienna Document 2011, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty — were also postponed or paused during this period.

But some agreements were faring better. The IAEA, tasked with verification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), has already been using methods of remote monitoring for some time. By the end of 2019, the Agency employed 1,425 cameras operating or ready to use at 261 facilities in 37 states.¹³ This included 1,031 next generation surveillance system cameras that were housed in tamper-resistant containers and equipped with a long-life power supply that could reliably operate for extended periods without access to external power.¹⁴ The IAEA also ran 162 unattended monitoring systems installed in 23 states, which transmitted data remotely to agency headquarters in Vienna. Finally, the agency had an Online Enrichment Monitor installed in Iran, which provided live 24/7 updates on the level of enrichment at Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant.¹⁵ Remote monitoring did not fully substitute for on-site inspections. The IAEA even had to charter planes to deliver its inspectors, when regular flights were not available because of the coronavirus.¹⁶ However, it saved time and money under the normal conditions and became invaluable at times when inspector access was limited.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), which runs an international monitoring system with dozens of automatic stations across the world, also weathered the epidemic with minimal disturbance. According to Executive Secretary of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission Lassina Zerbo, after thirteen weeks of predominantly remote operation and maintenance activities all noble gas systems and hydroacoustic stations were operational as well as around 90 per cent of seismic and infrasound stations.¹⁷

Just as the pandemic caused a boom in remote work, it might result in remote instruments gaining more prominence in arms control agreements. Over the past decade, scholars and practitioners suggested various ways to monitor or verify arms control–related activities. Research in the field of arms control and international security more generally has embraced open source intelligence methods. In particular, analysts have been using remote sensing data from various sources, including mapping websites and publicly available imagery from government agencies as well as from commercial satellite companies.¹⁸ Tamara Patton suggests that an international monitoring system considered within the UN in the context of nuclear disarmament could unite several elements such as ‘satellite imagery, wide area environmental monitoring and civil society reporting’.¹⁹ Finally, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) might be increasingly used in certain scenarios. UAVs can help monitor military activities in conflict zones, including arms embargoes (as in the case of the UN Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo)²⁰ or withdrawal of weapons (as in the case of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine)²¹ in compliance with relevant agreements. UAVs may also be considered as an alternative to manned aerial surveys for exercise observations under the Vienna Document 2011.²² While these and other remote instruments will not immediately catch on in the arms control field, the disruption caused by the pandemic could well be used as another argument in their favour.

Russian-US nuclear arms control agreements already include verification with national technical means (NTMs), mostly satellite imagery. However, the idea of introducing IAEA-type remote monitoring systems at military nuclear facilities would certainly face a backlash on security grounds. At the same time, similar concerns were raised before with inspectors’ visits, and the parties were able to come up with the protocols that balanced transparency with security. Some elements of remote monitoring could even be compelling to the militaries. While the verification mechanisms are tailored for specific arms control treaties and their main goal is to validate the necessary information, other factors are considered in their development. When crafting the New START Treaty verification provision, the US side was pushed by its own military to reduce the number of inspections and merge some activities together so as not to impede the normal functioning of military facilities.²³ Adding automation and remote monitoring could reduce the number of inspections while increasing the robustness of verification mechanisms in case of epidemics or another force majeure.

At the same time, it is important to remember that certain aspects of arms control involve human presence specifically to serve as confidence-building measures. Personal trust is important both during negotiations, which is best exemplified by the role that the relationship between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan played in Soviet-US talks, and during implementation of arms control agreements. These contacts can help to better understand each other’s concerns and motivations and to jointly work on solutions for arising issues. Verification activities, such as on-site inspections or overflights under the Open Skies Treaty, as well as follow-up events, such as review conferences, regularly bring together military and diplomatic personnel from the states involved.

Verification activities can be regarded as adversarial by inspected states when they are enforcement measures (e.g., in the case of the UN Special Commission inspections in Iraq) but in an equitable relationship they can foster co-operation. According to a German report on early inspections under the CFE Treaty, ‘In most cases the personnel at military units being inspected proved friendly and hospitable’ and ‘throughout the Eastern group of states, and especially in Russia, the base commanders receiving inspections teams seemed pleased to have the opportunity to show off their units and to discuss common problems with other military professionals from the West’.²⁴ Military officers participating in Open Skies flights are bound to co-operate by the design of the treaty as they ‘share a common interest in ensuring the safe operation of the aircraft and that the flight conforms with regulations governing international air traffic’.²⁵ Professional contacts are and will remain critical to arms control; replacing them should be avoided.

4 Securitisation

The pandemic stirred numerous speculations about origins of the coronavirus and its being a biological weapon. The spread of conspiracy theories²⁶ was amplified by the US-China public feud. In mid-March 2020 the spokesperson of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zhao Lijian, alleged that the US Army could have been involved in spreading coronavirus to Wuhan, China.²⁷ In early May, President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated that the coronavirus was somehow connected to the laboratory in Wuhan, hinting at evidence they had seen. This was backed by US diplomats reportedly leaking a dossier that made the same case against China to the Australian media.²⁸

However, the accusations, especially on the US side, were not framed as an arms control issue. The United States did not formally accuse China of non-compliance with the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) that banned ‘biological agents, or toxins … that have no justification for … peaceful purposes’. The reason for it is rooted in the uneasy relations between the United States and the BWC. Despite banning an entire type of weapons of mass destruction, the Convention does not have provisions to verify compliance. Even the exchange of confidence-building measures (CBMs) agreed at the Second Review Conference of the States Parties in 1986 has a rather poor track record.²⁹ Unlike the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty or the Chemical Weapons Convention, the BWC does not have a specialised organisation tasked with the implementation of the treaty.

In 2001, a draft protocol to the BWC was developed aimed at correcting those deficiencies.³⁰ The protocol would bind states to declare their activities connected to biological agents that could be weaponised. It would also create the Organisation for the Prohibition of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons to carry out verification activities, including transparency visits. Finally, the protocol would allow States Parties to request investigations of disease outbreaks when biological weapons use could be suspected. However, the protocol was successively rejected by the administrations of George W. Bush (in 2001) and Barack Obama (in 2009), which put the idea to rest. As US Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher stated in 2009, ‘Legally binding protocol would not achieve meaningful verification or greater security. It is extraordinarily difficult to verify compliance’.³¹ There was no change in the US position under the administration of Donald Trump; instead, Washington opted for political demands towards China.

While there has been no immediate effect of the pandemic on biological arms control, in the longer run this should not be excluded. Because of the scope and severity of the crisis, there has been a tendency for securitisation of biological and healthcare issues.³² This might translate into governments’ efforts to create new security instruments or modify existing ones to address these issues.

So far, this has been illustrated by Australia’s proposal to give the World Health Organization (WHO) powers similar to weapons inspectors. In April, Australian officials questioned China’s transparency in the context of coronavirus and demanded an independent review of what happened.³³ Prime Minister Scott Morrison called for expanded authorities for the WHO ‘that would enable independent public health inspectors to be able to go into areas where a virus of potential pandemic implications can be understood quickly’.³⁴ He compared those to inspectors under weapons-related international arrangements, implying that the WHO members would be obliged to accept inspections in the case of concerns among other members. In the run-up to the 73rd World Health Assembly (WHA) in May, Australia sought to generate international support for its proposal, specifically from the United States and Europe,³⁵ despite China’s strong opposition to its push for enquiry.³⁶ Yet the initiative to expand WHO’s powers has so far failed to gain momentum,³⁷ and the WHA agreed only to initiate a comprehensive response to the pandemic.³⁸

It remains to be seen whether the increased awareness and securitisation of biological threats due to the coronavirus crisis will lead to strengthening of the biological arms control architecture. Despite Australia’s efforts, the WHO is an unlikely venue for this. Still, other states might use the momentum to promote new ideas in the lead-up to the 9th Review Conference of the BWC in 2021.

5 Conclusion

It is important not to overstate the uniqueness of challenges that arms control and non-proliferation diplomacy faced because of the COVID-19. A lot of the issues that arms control diplomats encountered were shared by their colleagues across the profession. However, the field has several distinctive features (importance to national security, high technological complexity) that merited a deeper look into how it was affected by the pandemic.

This essay also was not meant to exhaust all of the ways the COVID-19 impacted arms control and disarmament diplomacy. For example, the question of how the economic consequences of the pandemic will affect defence budgets and what impact this will have on the arms control negotiations deserves further research. It is too early to assess the legacy of COVID-19 pandemic for the international security. However, there are clear trends, which could influence the ways the arms control and non-proliferation negotiations are held and agreements are implemented and verified.

One thing which stood out was the need for a backup channel that could support lengthy highly technical and confidential negotiations. Communication should be as seamless as possible so that the experts can focus on the substance. As the example of the recent online conference on the Open Skies Treaty shows, connection issues can affect the substance of the discussion.

Equally important would be to consider the possibility of disruptions like the one caused by the pandemic when negotiating verification measures for the arms control and non-proliferation treaties. Remote verification methods are likely to gain increased attention. At the same time, it is critical not to throw the baby out with the bathwater. People-to-people contacts as a part of verification and transparency measures are highly important for confidence building and should be preserved to the extent possible.

Finally, the pandemic put the biological issues on the top of the global agenda. Traditionally, providing biosecurity was considered to be a responsibility of individual states within their territories. However, the scale of disruption caused by COVID-19 could lead to a push to place biosecurity under international control or at least treat it as an international security concern. Similar processes happened in the nuclear security (prevention of theft or sabotage of nuclear materials) sphere. While the states kept full control and responsibility over nuclear security matters, the process of Nuclear Security Summits spearheaded by the Obama Administration led to significant changes in participating countries. The IAEA started to pay greater attention to nuclear security co-operation and created a specialised division to deal with the issue. Securitisation of biological issues because of the pandemic may stir a similar trend in biosecurity.